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ABSTRACT
My research analyzes the impact that new technology can have on consumers’ welfare
and the strategic responses from firms. My dissertation focuses on the television indus-
try, which has experienced dramatic changes within the last decade with improvements in
technology and the introduction of streaming video services. The entry of streaming video
services is important to study because this new product has had a disruptive effect on the
economic environment for the television industry, including direct and indirect effects on
consumer welfare.
In chapter one, I explore the implications of the direct effect of streaming video services
on consumer product choice and consumer welfare. To quantify the benefits from streaming
video services, I build a model for the demand of television services in the United States.
The model uses the multiple-discrete choice framework, which allows for consumers to
choose a traditional package, a streaming video service, or a combination of these ser-
vices. To estimate the model, I construct a new market-level dataset with prices, product
characteristics, and observed demand for 2014 and 2015. I then conduct three counterfac-
tual simulations to measure the change in consumer welfare when a product is removed
from the choice set. The simulation results suggest that removing the streaming service
has around 3 times as large of an effect on consumer welfare as compared to removing a
satellite provider.
Then, in chapter two I explore the indirect effects that the entry of streaming services
had on consumer welfare through cable television package prices. In particular, I exam-
ine the strategic response to this new product for the cable package prices. I quantify
ix
this effect by expanding upon the methodology from chapter one to include a supply-side
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with differentiated products. Then, I use GMM to estimate the
cost parameters for cable providers. After these parameters are estimated, I run a counter-
factual simulation that removes the streaming service from the consumer’s choice sets and
re-evaluates the equilibrium prices for cable providers. I find that the entry of streaming
services may have led to a $15 increase in cable prices per month, and the median con-
sumer welfare effect is $6.26 per month, which means that as of 2014 and 2015 the median
household would be willing to pay $6.26 per month to avoid the higher cable prices from
the entry of Netflix.
Finally, changes in the economic environment from the entry of a new product will
have implications for competition. Therefore, streaming services should be considered
when analyzing antitrust cases, new policies, and regulations. In the third chapter, I use
the models and data from chapters one and two to examine a proposed horizontal merger
between the top two cable providers in the era of streaming services to understand the
impact that this merger would have on consumer welfare. When considering a horizontal
merger, antitrust authorities weigh the pros and cons. The case for a merger would be
synergies in production or increased scale which could lead to lower costs and ultimately
lower prices for consumers. The case against a merger could be the concern for increased
concentration where the firms can exert more market power and ultimately raise prices.
The counterfactual simulation in this chapter quantifies the consumer welfare effect from
the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable. I find that the median
consumer welfare effect is $4.01 per month, which means that as of 2014 and 2015 the
median household would be willing to pay $4.01 per month to avoid the higher cable prices
from the merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable. Therefore, the antitrust authorities
were justifiably concerned about this proposed merger.
x
INTRODUCTION
My dissertation is comprised of three chapters, tied by motivation and methodology.
Each successive chapter deepens my analysis of the impact that new technology can have
on the economic environment within an industry. In particular, my dissertation focuses on
the television industry, which has experienced dramatic changes within the last decade with
the improvements in technology and the entry of streaming video services.
The entry of a new product will have implications for the economic environment within
an industry. However, not all new products have the same impact on an industry. When a
new product enters the market, it can be categorized as a minor improvement to an existing
product, or it can define an entirely new category of a product. For example, the introduc-
tion of satellite and streaming services offer an interesting contrast. Satellite services could
be classified as a minor improvement to a pre-existing product, cable packages. While
streaming video services could be classified as a more disruptive new product, creating an
entirely new type of television service. They offered a new and more flexible way for view-
ers to consume television. Therefore, the entry of streaming video services is important to
study because this new product has had a disruptive effect on the economic environment
for the television industry, including direct and indirect effects on consumer welfare.
The direct effect of a new product on consumer welfare is captured with the consumer
product choice decision. When a new product enters, consumers can choose an entirely
new type of television service, which can directly affect their welfare. The indirect effect on
consumer welfare includes changes to characteristics of other products in the market, such
as price. There are two channels in which a new product can affect the price of television
1
services: (1) the pricing condition for television distributors through increased competition
and (2) the bargaining between upstream television content producers and downstream
television content distributors. The increased competition should have downward pressure
on prices. While the bargaining environment could have upward pressure on prices due to
the changes to the market structure in the television industry, which could lead to increased
input costs from the negotiations over licensing fees for content.
The three channels that a new product can affect consumer welfare are studied in chap-
ters one and two. I explore the implications of the direct effect on consumer product choice
and consumer welfare in chapter one. Then, in chapter two I explore the indirect effects
that the entry of streaming services had on consumer welfare through cable television pack-
age prices. Finally, changes in the economic environment from the entry of a new product
will have implications for competition. Therefore, streaming services should be consid-
ered when analyzing antitrust cases, new policies, and regulations. In chapter three, I use
the models and data from chapters one and two to examine a proposed horizontal merger
between the top two cable providers in the era of streaming services.
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CHAPTER 1
Quantifying the Benefits to Consumers of Subscription-based
Streaming Video Services
1.1 Introduction
The television industry has changed dramatically within the last decade, with vast improve-
ments in technology and the entry of streaming video services. Streaming video services
flourished, and consumers started opting-out of their traditional services with the first ever
decline in the total traditional subscriber count in 2013. Traditional providers recognize the
competitive pressures they face from this new delivery method:
“. . . any analysis of the state of video competition that ignores or minimizes
the impact of online video distributors will seriously miss the mark.” (Com-
cast comment for Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 2015 Video
Competition Report)
However, the literature and policy analysis continue to isolate traditional services when
analyzing the industry. Using new data, in this chapter, I quantify the direct effect that
streaming services have had on consumer welfare. As outlined in the introduction to my
dissertation, this is the first of three channels for the entry of streaming services to impact
consumer welfare.
In order to quantify the benefits from streaming video services, I build a model for the
demand of television services in the United States. I use a random coefficient multiple-
discrete choice framework which allows for consumers to choose a traditional package,
a streaming video service, or a combination of these services. The model is estimated
using a new market-level data set that I assembled from a variety of sources. This dataset
includes information on product characteristics, subscription prices, and market shares for
the top providers for 2014 and 2015. Based on the model’s estimates, I find that even after
allowing for the multiple-discrete choice, the cross-price elasticities between traditional
3
and streaming services are positive, which suggests that consumers view these services as
substitutes.
Then, using my model, I run three counterfactual simulations. In each simulation I
remove a provider from the choice set, and then I use compensating variation to quantify
the welfare effect. I find that the median household1 would need to be paid $69 annually in
order to be compensated for the loss of Netflix. 2 This is approximately three times the $25
compensation required when the simulation is repeated with the DirecTV services removed
for the same years. These results highlight that streaming video services are highly valued
by consumers, and suggest that it is important to include streaming services in the model
for the demand of television services.
This chapter contributes to three branches of the industrial organization literature: new
product valuation, multiple-discrete choice framework, and studies of the television indus-
try. When a new product enters the market it can be categorized as a minor improvement to
an existing product, or it can define an entirely new category of a product. For example, one
could classify the entry of satellite services as a minor improvement to pre-existing cable
packages. In contrast, streaming services were a more disruptive innovation—they offered
a new and more flexible way for viewers to consume television. Previous studies have in-
vestigated the welfare effects from the introduction of satellite services, such as Goolsbee
and Petrin (2004), Chu (2010), and Crawford et al. (2019). A key assumption in these
papers was that consumers were making a single-discrete choice. This assumption was ap-
propriate given the nature of the products available at the time (cable and satellite subscrip-
tions). However, after streaming services were introduced some consumers subscribed to a
combination3 of traditional and streaming services. Therefore, the single-discrete choice is
no longer appropriate.
My chapter extends previous studies of the television industry in three ways. The first
extension allows consumers to choose more than one type of television service. My model
for demand builds on the methodology developed in the multiple-discrete choice literature,
such as Fan (2013), Hendel (1999), Dube (2004). The multiple-discrete choice assumption
implies that consumers can choose a variety of services, an important feature of the current
landscape. The second extension is the construction of a new dataset4. This dataset spans a
later time period, and it is the first to include streaming video services in the product market
1This is the median of the average-per household compensating variation.
2Note, this is a short-run effect. In the long run, there could be changes to products characteristics or
market structure which could further impact consumer welfare.
3The SNL Kagan Consumer Insights survey from 2016 finds that 43% of households consume a traditional
and streaming service. While other consumers “cut the cord”, by canceling their cable subscription and only
choose to subscribe to streaming services.
4Following the historical cable prices data collection method outlined in Crawford et al. (2018).
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definition.
The new economic environment created by the entry of streaming video services has
implications for competition within the television industry. Modeling the competition is
important for policy analysis and regulation. Therefore, the framework established in this
chapter can be used as a building block towards understanding the broader impact that
streaming services have had on the television industry. Streaming services could be in-
cluded when analyzing antitrust cases (e.g., the AT&T and Time Warner merger), new
policies (e.g., net neutrality), or legacy regulations (e.g., program access and broadcast
retransmission fees, regulations which only effect traditional providers).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the second section highlights the
trends within the television industry, the third section describes the dataset, the fourth sec-
tion formalizes the model for the demand of television services, the fifth section details the
estimation procedure and results, the sixth section presents the counterfactual simulation,
and the seventh section concludes.
1.2 Evolution of the Television Industry
The innovation of streaming video services fundamentally changed the television industry.
Given this change, it will be valuable to discuss a brief history of the television industry.
This examination will serve two purposes. First, it will provide context for the analysis
done in this chapter by describing trends in the subscription patterns over time. Second, it
will provide details for the evolution of television services.5
1.2.1 The Fall of Traditional Television
Historically, the television industry has seen the entrance of new types of subscription tele-
vision services, starting with satellite providers in the late 1990s then followed by telephone
providers (telco) in the mid-2000s. However, these new television services were very sim-
ilar to the pre-existing products offered by cable providers—packages of channels offered
as tiers of service (e.g. Basic, Expanded Basic). The television content that was being sold
was largely6 the same, especially after the 1999 Satellite Home Viewers’ Improvement Act
passed, which allowed satellite providers to air local channels.
As these new services were introduced, the overall subscriber count for traditional ser-
vices grew. Figure 1 panel (a) demonstrates the historical trends for the total traditional
5Note that the dataset includes the years 2014 and 2015 and focuses on the dominant streaming provider,
Netflix.
6There was some differentiation across delivery formats with the bundling of television and internet via
cable and telco providers, or the availability of out-of-network regional sports networks via satellite.
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subscriber counts and the breakdown by delivery format. As shown in this figure, the con-
sumption of television services changed in a noteworthy way over the past decade—the
total traditional subscriber count plateaued around 20097
Figure 1.1: Number of Subscribers to Television Services in the U.S.
(a) Traditional Delivery Formats (b) Traditional vs. Streaming†
The top three streaming providers during this period of time were Netflix, Amazon
Prime Video, and Hulu Plus. At the end of 2014, Netflix had over thirty-seven million do-
mestic subscribers, and Hulu Plus had approximately seven million domestic subscribers8,9
Furthermore, according to Nielsen Local Watch estimates, Netflix accounted for over sixty-
five percent of subscribers among these three providers in 2014. Given Netflix’s dominance
at the time, and data constraints for the other providers, the analysis done in this chapter
7The Great Recession is an important economic setting to keep in mind for this point in time. The
recession caused disposable income to fall, so people were cutting back on their expenses. Having said that,
the recession cannot be the sole explanation for this pattern given that subscriber counts continued to fall, and
the decline accelerated even after the economy recovered.
8Hulu is not a publicly traded company, so the total domestic subscriber counts are estimates based on
values that are reported by the company or calculated by SNL Kagan.
9Amazon’s streaming video service is offered as a bundled product and is included in the Prime mem-
bership, which includes, among other benefits, the 2-day shipping speed for their e-commerce sales. The
bundling of these services means that I am not able to isolate the historical series of Amazon’s “video ser-
vices” users from their annual reports, which only list Prime subscribers. This data restriction is why panel
1(b) only includes national subscriber counts for Netflix and Hulu Plus.
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will focus on Netflix. The next section summarizes the entry of streaming video services,
thus establishing a timeline of events and their role in the industry.
1.2.2 The Entry of Streaming Video Services
With a view to understand the role of streaming video services within the industry, I estab-
lish a timeline for their entry into the market. This timeline will include an examination of
the popular streaming services that were released from 2007 to 2016. For perspective, the
analysis done in this chapter will focus on Netflix for the periods 2014 and 2015. However,
the roll-out of streaming services as a whole will contextualize the analysis done in this
chapter, and describe trends within the industry. The remainder of this section details key
events for streaming services, which are highlighted in figure 1.2 below.
Figure 1.2: Timeline for the Entry of Streaming Video Services
In February 2007, Netflix started offering a “watch now” feature which allowed their
subscribers to view content directly on Netflix’s website. This feature was included with
their standard DVD subscription service, but it had some restrictions on the amount of
streaming allotted per month. These restrictions ranged from around 6 to 18 hours, which
was determined by their subscription plan. Then, in 2008, Netflix lifted this constraint and
allowed unlimited streaming for their subscribers. The streaming feature grew in popularity
as internet quality improved, and Netflix continued to partner with hardware companies for
content delivery. Around the same time, additional streaming services started entering the
market, beginning with Hulu in March 2008. Hulu started out as a free streaming service
supported by advertising. Then, in November 2010, Netflix and Hulu started offering their
stand-alone subscription-based services. These services gave subscribers access to a library
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of television shows and movies which they could watch at anytime.
From 2007–2012, the streaming providers were acting as content aggregators, then
starting in 2013 there was a shift towards producing exclusive original content. Netflix was
the first streaming service to venture into original content by releasing House of Cards in
February 2013. This venture proved fruitful for them, and they have expanded their pro-
duction of exclusive content. Then, from 2014 to 2016, premium television networks also
started to enter the market with stand-alone streaming services (e.g., HBO Now, Showtime,
and Starz). In April 2014, HBO released its first stand-alone subscription-based service,
HBO Now. Prior to this date, consumers were required to have a cable or satellite subscrip-
tion to purchase HBO. With the launch of HBO Now, consumers were able to bypass the
cable and satellite providers and get content directly from HBO—followed by Showtime
Anytime in July 2015 and Starz in April 2016.
The timeline in figure 1.2 ends mid-2016 because the analysis done in this chapter is
limited to 2014 and 2015. However, it is important to point out that streaming services con-
tinue to thrive, and there were even more streaming video services released after 2016. In
particular, some high-profile services were recently released, including Disney+ and Ap-
ple TV. Given these events, it is clear that the streaming delivery method has fundamentally
changed the marketplace, and the industry will continue to move towards exclusive/original
programming and the streaming service delivery method.
1.2.3 Policy Implications
The streaming delivery method had a disruptive effective on the television industry, both
in the consumer’s purchasing behavior and in the addition of new stand-alone products.10
Traditional providers recognize the competitive pressures they face from this new deliv-
ery method; however, the literature and regulators11 continue to isolate traditional services
when analyzing the industry. Excluding streaming services from the analysis ignores the
importance of this new distribution method, and this exclusion could impact conclusions
drawn about the competition within the industry. Therefore, this decision could also have
important implications for the understanding of current policy issues and regulations (e.g,
10Traditional distributors have also started offering virtual services (e.g., DirecTV Now, Sling TV) which
are sold as skinny bundles, and expanding their TV Everywhere channel lineups. The skinny bundles won’t
be included as a product in this analysis because the subscriber counts are only available at the national-level.
Note, these services comprise a very small share of the market—around one percent.
11On page 63 of U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon’s opinion for the AT&T and Time Warner merger
he defined the relevant product market definition to include traditional linear television services. Though,
in footnote 21 he points out that the government (who proposed the product market definition) also stated
that a broader definition which includes streaming video services and virtual traditional services would also
constitute a relevant product market definition. United States v. AT&T INC. (2018)
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antitrust cases12, net neutrality, or legacy regulations13).
1.3 Data
There are two market definitions that are necessary when estimating demand: the relevant
product market and the relevant geographic market. These definitions affect the scope of
the dataset that needs to be assembled for the estimation. The prior literature restricted the
product market to the television packages that are offered by the traditional distributors.
This chapter expands on this definition by including the dominant streaming service, Net-
flix. The geographic market definition will be the combination of year, Designated Media
Area (DMA), and county. The remainder of this section will describe details of the dataset
including the sources, the sample selection, and the summary statistics.
The new dataset assembled in this chapter includes characteristics and market pene-
tration rates for the top traditional distributors’ packages and the top streaming service for
2014 and 2015. The dataset was constructed by collecting and combining information from
a variety of sources. Table 1.1 displays a summary of the sources used for the specific vari-
ables within the dataset. This table also lists the geographic availability of the data and
indicates when the data from that source is from a year other than 2014 or 2015.
Table 1.1: Data Sources (2014 - 2015)
Variables Source(s) Geography
Traditional
Package price
SNL Kagan, Select DMAs,
Distributors
Web Archive, Warren County, National
Package subscribers SNL Kagan County
Channel lineup SNL Kagan DMA
24 hr listings by channel Channel Guide National
Netflix
Subscribers Nielsen Select DMAs
Price Web Archive National
Aggregate title count SNL Kagan National
Joint: Traditional Market penetration SNL Kagan, 2016 Survey National
& Streaming
Demographics
Median HH income Census, ACS County
Population density Census, ACS County
Share of HH by age Census, ACS County
Share of HH with access
Census, ACS Countyto 3mbs internet
12Such as the recent AT&T and Time Warner merger.
13Such as program access and broadcast retransmission fees.
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The SNL Kagan Media and Communications dataset includes information on the tradi-
tional distributors’ subscriber counts, channel lineups, and aggregate title counts for Net-
flix. Information on prices were found using the web archive, local cable commission
websites, provider’s forums, or the Warren Communications TV Factbook. The subscriber
penetration rates for Netflix at the DMA-level come from Nielsen Local Watch Reports for
2014 and 2015, and they are publicly available for Netflix’s top 10 DMAs.14
Nielsen started tracking the subscription to streaming video services in 2014. For the
years 2014 and 2015, Nielsen publicly reported Netflix’s penetration rates15 for the top 10
DMAs in their Local Watch Report.16 As seen in table 1.2, there is variation in the penetra-
tion rates across these DMAs and across time. The market penetration rates for traditional
television services come from the SNL Kagan Media Census which includes estimates of
the package-specific provider counts at the county-level. The nine traditional distributors
shown in table 1.3 capture the majority of subscribers within these DMAs.
Table 1.2: Top 10 DMAs by Netflix Penetration
2014 2015
San Francisco 48% 49%
Washington, DC 47 49
Denver 44 48
Los Angeles 43 49
New York 43 49
Seattle 42 50
Portland, OR 42 52
Boston 42 50
Phoenix 42 43
Sacramento 40 44
National 36 44
14Nielsen (2014) and Nielsen (2015)
15As I previously described, Netflix was the dominant streaming service in the market, therefore I include
Netflix as the only streaming option in the consumer’s choice set. Note however, that this methodology is
flexible to including more streaming services if the data permits.
16They track the subscription penetration rates for 25 DMAs which use “Local people meters (LPM).”
LPM “are used in the Top 25 markets to electronically capture both tuning and viewing at the household and
persons level.” Nielsen (2019) The data for the additional DMAs is available to purchase. Note that the 2015
Nielsen Local Watch Report excludes broadband only (BBO) homes from the penetration rates. When I spoke
with a Nielsen representative he explained that share of BBO homes was very small at this time therefore the
rankings should be unchanged.
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Table 1.3: Share of Total Traditional Subscribers (2015)
AT&T Cablevision Charter Comcast Cox Directv Dish TWC Verizon Sum
San Francisco 10.7% 59.3% 17.5% 10.0% 97.6%
DC 35.1 5.6 10.8 6.2 38.3 95.9
Denver 50.5 27.0 17.0 94.5
Los Angeles 7.7 6.2 24.5 15.4 30.5 10.7 95.0
New York 34.8 8.5 9.2 5.6 15.3 24.4 97.8
Seattle 61.9 18.5 11.7 92.1
Portland 51.6 23.5 15.4 90.5
Boston 5.6 64.3 6.4 3.9 15.2 95.4
Phoenix 39.0 30.0 20.0 89.1
Sacramento 10.6 39.0 25.3 16.2 91.2
Historical package prices for traditional distributors can be difficult to find at a local-
level. I followed the method described in the Crawford et al. (2018), which involved using
the web archive to obtain historical rate cards for the television services. Whenever possi-
ble, I used local rate cards or found rates listed in the web archive to populate the data. I
supplemented this with data from SNL Kagan and the Warren Communications TV Fact-
book. SNL Kagan collects an annual snapshot of package prices for the top traditional
distributors in select DMAs, however, this source is incomplete. There are DMAs that
a distributor serves that SNL Kagan did not record. Therefore, I also sought additional
sources, such as the Warren Communications TV Factbook. Warren includes datasets for
cable package prices at a principal community level.17,18 However, I only used Warren as
a source for basic prices if this information was not available elsewhere. Prices for the
satellite and streaming providers were easier to track down because the price is national.
This information was found by visiting the distributor’s website stored in the web archive.
The TV show variables are constructed to create a common characteristic between tra-
ditional and streaming services. The unique TV show title count for traditional distributors
is found by using the 24 hour TV listings from the Channel Guide and the channel lineups
for each package from SNL Kagan. The unique TV show title count for Netflix is found
by scraping the content library on the web archive. After these variables are constructed, I
can calculate the percentage overlap of TV show titles across traditional and streaming ser-
vices. This measure will represent content differentiation across traditional and streaming
17The principal community includes a list of counties that are served by this provider in the area.
18There are well-documented downsides with this source (e.g. sample attrition, they only track cable
distributors, which means telco packages aren’t included).
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services.
The market demographic variables come from the Census American Community Sur-
vey. These variables are at the county/year level and include information on the median
household income, the population density, the share of heads of households in a county
that fall within an age bin, and the share of households with access to 3 mbs internet. The
age bins roughly align with generational breakdowns. At the time the youngest group, ages
15 to 34, maps to the millennial generation. The second age bin, 35 to 54, maps to the
number of households in Gen X. The final age bin, 55+, maps to generations of Boomers
and older. Additional details about the dataset can be found in Appendix A.
The summary statistics for the dataset are presented in table 1.4, and table 1.5 shows
the summary statistics broken down by type. The price is defined as the monthly adver-
tised price for a provider’s television package19, adjusted for inflation. For some firms,
these are national prices (e.g. Dish and DirecTV), while for other firms the prices may
vary at the county or DMA-level. The channel lineups and TV show title counts varies
at the DMA-level, and the demographic information vary by county. The total number of
provider/package observations across markets is 9,163. The dataset includes 458 distinct
markets, which are the county/DMA/year combinations.
Table 1.4: Summary Statistics (2014 - 2015)
N Mean SD Min Max
Monthly Advertised Price 9163 71.72 30.56 8.99 157.99
Unique TV show title count 9163 992.25 400.91 199 1441
Overlap of TV show titles with Netflix (%) 9163 7.23 1.88 0 11.29
Median HH income ($10k) 458 5.94 1.91 2.68 12.4
Population density (per sq. mile) 458 1627.55 6238.47 .2 71596.9
Share of HH aged 15 to 34 458 .166 .057 .049 .466
Share of HH aged 35 to 54 458 .368 .0623 .169 .554
Share of HH aged 55+ 458 .464 .088 .269 .718
Share of HH with access to 3mbs internet 458 .628 .215 .1 .9
19For traditional providers this will not include bundle discounts from combining services. For streaming
services this will represent the monthly subscription rate.
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Table 1.5: Summary of Characteristics by Type (2014 - 2015)
N Mean SD Min Max
Traditional
Unique TV Show Titles 9143 991.99 401.31 199 1441
Monthly Advertised Price 9143 71.85 30.46 9.8 157.99
Streaming
Unique TV Show Titles 20 1107 35.90 1072 1142
Monthly Advertised Price 20 9.57 .6052 8.99 10.16
This new dataset can be used to analyze the television industry with several advantages
relative to past studies, including the following: the data spans a new and more recent time
period, the inclusion of the new delivery format (streaming services), and the new source
for television shows airing on traditional networks.
1.4 Demand
This section details the model for the demand of subscription television services which
includes both traditional packages and a streaming service in the consumer’s choice set.
The household decision for the subscription to television services will be modeled at the
county-level. The choice set for the household will include the packages from local cable
or telco providers, packages offered by the satellite providers (DirecTV and Dish), and the
top streaming service (Netflix). The households can choose to subscribe to one television
service, two television services, or none.
For ease of notation, letm denote the market combination of county c, and DMA d. The
conditional indirect utility function of subscribing to the television service j, for household
i, in market m, in year t, will take the following form:
Uijmt = αpjmt + βXjdt + φYmt + ηi,format(j) + γd + ζt + ξjmt + ijmt
where Xjdt includes non-price product characteristics, such as the unique count of tele-
vision shows, and pjmt is the advertised monthly subscription price for the television ser-
vice.20 Ymt includes county characteristics such as the fraction of householders by age
within a county. Finally, the ξjmt term is the unobserved product characteristics.
The ηi,format(j) allows for persistent horizontal differentiation across format types (wired,
satellite). These heterogeneous tastes could account for format-specific characteristics,
such as the transmission technology itself or alternative features that are included with
20Some of the products have prices that are national (e.g. satellite, streaming)
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each format type. This term will also capture unobserved, within-market heterogeneity in
access to each format type. Finally, the consumers also have an idiosyncratic preference
shock for the product j, ijmt. These are assumed to be i.i.d. draws from a mean zero Type
I Extreme Value distribution with the scale parameter, σ, normalized to 1.
The market penetration will follow the method used in Fan (2013), and the probability
that household i chooses product j as their first or second choice in market m at time t is:
P(Yimt = j|X, ..) = P(Uijmt > max
s
Uis,∀s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(j is first)
+
∑
j′
P(Uij′mt > Uijmt > max
h6=j′
Uihmt, Uijmt − κ > Ui0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(j is second)
where Uijmt is the conditional utility from consuming the television subscription service j,
and κ is the diminishing utility from consuming more than one type of television service.
The market penetration can be found by integrating the probability of choosing product
j across households. Then, for streaming services take the weighted average to aggregate
the market penetration rates to the observed DMA-level. Further details of the market
penetration equation and aggregation can be found in Appendix B.
1.5 Estimation
Following the methodology developed in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), I estimate
the demand for television services using a contraction mapping nested within a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation routine21. The contraction mapping routine will
search over the mean utility vector until the difference between the predicted market pene-
tration and the observed market penetration is less than a specified convergence threshold.
The solution22 to the contraction mapping will be a vector δjmt(Sjmt, ση, κ) which is a
function of the observed market penetration and the non-linear parameters, which is then
substituted into the definition of the mean utility:
δjct(Sjmt, ση, κ) = αpjmt + βXjmt + φYmt + ηformat(j) + γd + ζt + ξjmt
where the mean utility is the component within the utility of product j which is com-
mon to all consumers. Therefore, a linear estimating equation drops out of the contraction
21The market penetration function defined for this problem is highly non-linear which complicates the
estimation routine.
22Fan (2013) includes a proof which shows that a multiple-discrete choice model will have a unique so-
lution to the contraction mapping under two assumptions on the market penetration: (1) 0 < sjt < 1∀j =
1, .., Jct and (2)
∑Jct
j=1 sjt < 2.
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mapping over the non-linear market penetration equation. Because this is a linear equa-
tion, it allows for the error term, ξjmt to be inverted and used in the moment condition.
Furthermore, instrumental variable estimating techniques can be used to correct for the en-
dogeniety of prices. Note that the contraction mapping will be nested within the GMM
optimization routine, so a new fixed point solution is required for every iteration of the
search over the non-linear parameters. Next, I will describe the identification requirements
for the parameters in the model for demand.
1.5.1 Identification
The set of parameters in the model for demand include α, β, φ, ση, and κ. These can be bro-
ken down into two categories, linear and non-linear. The non-linear parameters are terms
that affect the household-specific utility whereas the linear parameters affect the mean util-
ity of the product within the market.
The linear parameters β and φ follow a standard exogenous variation identification ar-
gument, but α will require more care due to the endogeneity of prices. The identification
strategy for α is an instrumental variable approach. One of the instruments for price in-
cludes a cost shifter, the lagged national subscriber count for the provider, as used in Byrne
(2015) and Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012). This will be a valid instrument if it is relevant,
correlated with the price and exogenous, not correlated with the error term. The argument
for relevance is that licensing fees are the primary marginal costs, and these are the outcome
of a negotiation with the channel conglomerates. These fees are not released publicly23, but
it is understood that if a traditional distributor is larger, then they will be able to negotiate a
smaller fee. So the size of the distributor effects the marginal cost, which effects the price.
The negotiations do not happen every year, so the licensing fees from a lagged year will
correspond with the licensing fees from the current year. The argument for exogeneity is
that the number of subscribers in a lagged year will not affect the demand for the product
in the current year. The first stage results are shown in Appendix C.
The non-linear parameters, ση and κ will also require further explanation for their iden-
tification. The ση is the parameter for persistent heterogeneous preferences for delivery
format within the model. Therefore, σ2η is the variance for the household’s tastes for for-
mat type (wired, satellite), and it will have implications for the substitution patterns across
formats. This parameter will be identified based on the changes in the market shares as
the choice set varies across markets, and the substitution patterns are driven by exogenous
variation in the overall level of prices. If there is a larger variance in these tastes, then there
23SNL Kagan includes estimations of the national average for basic cable licensing fees for each channel,
as was used in Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) and Crawford et. al 2018.
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will be less substitution across formats in general, relative to substitution within formats.
If there is a smaller variance in these tastes, then there is more substitution across formats
in general.
The final parameter is κ, which is the diminishing utility from consuming more than
one television service. If κ is∞, then the households would either subscribe to zero or one
television service. If κ is −∞, then all of the households would subscribe to zero or two
television services. In reality, there is a mixture of households subscribing to the services.
This parameter will be pinned down by the joint-decision moment condition. This condi-
tion matches the observed fraction of households that subscribe to both types of services
(traditional and streaming) to the weighted average24 of the second choice probability from
the model.
1.5.2 Results
The estimated price coefficient of αˆ = -0.123 (0.053), which has the expected sign. The
exogenous characteristics include the log of the number of TV show titles and the overlap
of tv shows between each package and Netflix. The TV show count (β1) has a positive
effect on the mean utility for households, and the overlap (β2) has a slightly negative effect.
The estimates for the remaining parameters are shown in table 1.6.
The estimation accounts for market demographics by including the median income, age
bins, and urbanization measures for each county. The population density and income both
have negative effects on the households’ mean utility for television services. This result
aligns with a story that people in more urban and affluent areas rely less on television as a
form of leisure. The age bins are the share of households aged from 15 to 34, 35 to 54, and
55 and over. The oldest age group is the reference group for the estimation. The coefficient
is negative for the youngest, and positive for the middle. This result suggests that, on
average, middle-aged households prefer television the most, then the oldest households,
followed by the youngest. The DMA fixed effects (not reported) range from -1.09 to 0.95.
The non-linear parameters are κ and σformat(j). The parameter κ measures the dimin-
ished utility of subscribing to a second television service.25 I find that the estimate of κ
in this model is 0.295. The σformat(j) terms capture the heterogenous tastes for a format
type. The estimates for these parameters imply that there is a high degree of horizontal
differentiation, with the highest value being assigned to wired services.
24This second choice probability is aggregated across households, products, and DMAs.
25Note that setting the kappa parameter to infinity will recover the standard single discrete choice model,
with the implication that consumers will buy at most one product.
16
Table 1.6: Multiple-Discrete Choice Estimation Results
Estimates Std. Error
Mean utility
Price α -0.123∗ (0.053)
log(TV show count) β1 6.240∗∗ (2.30)
TV show overlap with Netflix (%) β2 -0.648∗∗ (0.215)
Median HH income ($10k) φ1 -0.142∗∗ (0.052)
Population density (/1000) φ2 -0.019∗∗∗ (0.005)
Share of HH aged 15 to 34 φ3 -4.162∗∗∗ (1.154)
Share of HH aged 35 to 54 φ4 -1.264 (1.389)
Share of HH with 3mbs internet φ5 -0.232 (0.776)
Horizontal heterogeneity
Wired format σwired 3.187 (2.586)
Satellite format σsatellite 2.796 (4.455)
Diminishing utility κ 0.295 (2.366)
Observations 9163
GMM Objective 1.333e-04
Note: The age bin for share of households aged 55 and over is excluded because the shares
sum to 1. The unit for population is 1000 individuals. The estimation includes fixed effects
for format, year, and DMA. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Next, I calculate the price elasticities for the demand of television services. The price
elasticity calculation in this chapter will be more complicated than a standard single-
discrete choice model because the market penetration equation has additional terms for the
second choice. Further details of this price elasticity calculation can be found in Appendix
D.
I find that the median own-price elasticity for all television services implied by the
model is -7.15. I also find an intuitive pattern in the median own-price elasticities across
the tiers of services; consumers are more elastic as the tier increases, as shown in table 1.7.
Table 1.7: Median Own-Price Elasticity Across Tiers
Basic -2.07
Expanded -7.06
Premium -14.73
The magnitude of the median own-price elasticity falls within the range of reported own-
price elasticities from other studies. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) find median own-
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price elasticities of -4.12 for the basic packages, -6.34 for expanded basic packages, and
-13.11 for digital basic packages. Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) report an elasticity of -1.5
for expanded basic cable packages. Both studies display the same pattern across tiers as
my estimates: demand is more elastic as the package quality increases.26 I also find that
the cross-price elasticities between Netflix and traditional services are positive, and thus
consumers treat these products as substitutes.27
1.6 Counterfactual Simulation
The counterfactual simulation in this chapter follows the method developed in Petrin (2002).
The consumer welfare effect is defined as compensating variation, which is the dollar
amount required for a consumer to be indifferent between the observed and counterfac-
tual scenarios. Note that this is interpreted as a short-run consumer welfare effect given
the time frame and the model used in this chapter. In the long run, there could be changes
to products characteristics or changes to the market structure which could further impact
consumer welfare. The formula for the compensating variation will be based on the closed
form solution derived in Small and Rosen (1981).
CVimt =
V 0i − V 1i
α
where α is the structural parameter for price28, V 0i is the observed inclusive value for con-
sumer i and the V 1i is the inclusive value from the counterfactual. As in Fan (2013) the
closed form solution from Small and Rosen (1981) needed to be extended to allow for the
consumer to choose up to two products. Note that in chapter one, all of the counterfactuals
will assume that there is no supply side response, which can be interpreted as a short-
run calculation where the prices and characteristics of the traditional distributors have not
responded. Further details of the derivation for the closed form compensating variation
expression can be found in appendix E.
I consider three counterfactual simulations. The first simulation removes Netflix from
the consumer’s choice set—this scenario will simulate a world in which the streaming ser-
26Additional results include the average cable provider’s elasticity of -1.69 and satellite own-elasticities
of -2.9 and -4.15 in Crawford et al. (2018), the basic own-price elasticity estimates of -1.5 in Rubinovitz
(1993),-5.9 in Chipty (2001), and -2.19 in FCC (2002).
27Even after I allow consumers to choose a combination of services with the multiple-discrete choice. The
price elasticity matrix for a sample market is included in Appendix D.
28Due to the linear specification of the utility function.
18
vice disappeared in 2014 and 2015.29 The second and third simulations remove Comcast
and DirecTV from the consumer’s choice set, respectively. This is a useful exercise to see
how consumer welfare responds across delivery formats. Moreover, it provides a bench-
mark for the streaming result.30
Table 1.8: Counterfactual Simulations (Monthly)
Median ∆Welfarect
1
∆Welfare (millions)
Remove Netflix -$5.71 -$315.9
Remove Comcast -$5.472 -$194.7
Remove DirecTV -$2.11 -$80.7
1The monthly average per-household CV
2Excludes markets that Comcast does not serve.
Table 1.8 shows the median change in average-per household welfare31 across the three
simulations. In the first simulation, I find that the median household would need to be
compensated $5.71 per month, or $68.52 annually to achieve the same level of utility as
when they can consume Netflix.32 In the second and third simulations, I find that consumers
need to be compensated $5.47 per month to account for Comcast being removed, and $2.11
per month to account for DirecTV being removed. Overall, consumer welfare declines by
$315.9 million when Netflix is removed from the choice set.
Figure 3 shows the average per-household welfare change across markets.33 The mar-
kets in the three panels are sorted according to the welfare loss from removing Netflix. The
data within the panel is labeled for the population density of each market—the markets that
are above the median population density are marked in light blue and the markets below
the median are marked in black. Note that because products are being removed from the
choice set, the welfare change is expected to be negative. The median welfare loss from the
removal of Netflix is the largest, and there is variation across markets. The markets with
the most extreme welfare loss are more densely populated. Panel (a) shows the distribu-
tion of welfare loss from the removal of Netflix. Panels (b) and (c) show how the welfare
29Ideally, this simulation would go back to the “pre-period” to capture the effect of the introduction of
streaming services. However, the data restrictions prevent this time period from being estimated.
30In many ways, the simulation for the satellite provider will be a cleaner comparison for streaming (e.g.,
both providers are available nationally, and without bundles for internet).
31Calculated using the average-per household compensating variation expression.
32An interesting benchmark is the value that was calculated in Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), they find that
consumers have a compensating variation of $127–190 per year from the introduction of satellite services.
Note that this isn’t a directly comparable result but a useful reference point.
33Each dot represents a different market’s welfare effect.
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changes for the other two providers with the markets sorted by the welfare loss from Net-
flix.Interesting patterns emerge across both the panels.
Figure 1.3: Average Per-Household Welfare Effect Across Markets
Notes: Each dot represents a different market. All three figures show the markets sorted by the welfare change
from removing Netflix.The median population density for the sample is 103.13 people per square mile. Panel
(b) excludes markets that Comcast does not serve.
In panel (b) there is a negative relationship between the welfare loss for Comcast and
Netflix. In particular, a market that experienced a higher welfare loss when Netflix was
removed will tend to exhibit lower welfare loss when Comcast is removed. In panel (c) a
separate, yet interesting pattern emerges. When considering less densely populated mar-
kets, the negative relationship between the welfare change for Netflix and DirecTV is very
stark. Markets with high welfare loss for Netflix tend to exhibit lower welfare loss for Di-
recTV. The markets that are more densely populated appear to be invariant to the removal
of Netflix. A potential explanation for these markets could be that households in these areas
have access to satellite, but have more impediments for using the satellite services (e.g., tall
buildings); therefore when satellite services are removed, there will be less of an effect on
their welfare.
Further analysis for the relationship between the welfare measure and the market char-
acteristics are shown in table 1.9. I run a regression of the compensating variation measure
on market characteristics to further understand how the welfare effect varies across mar-
kets. Note, that the impact of a provider’s removal from the choice set depends on how
viewers value watching television services. Therefore, if the households in a market do not
like watching television, then their welfare will not be largely affected by a product being
removed.
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Table 1.9: Average Per-Household Welfare Effect Across Markets
(1) (2) (3)
Remove Netflix Remove Comcast Remove DirecTV
Median HH Income ($10k) -0.049 -0.118 0.110∗∗
(0.028) (0.133) (4.01)
Population Density 0.008 -0.036 -0.006
(0.006) (0.026) (-0.91)
Share of HH aged 15 to 34 -2.452∗∗∗ -4.538 5.402∗∗∗
(0.608) (2.909) (7.68)
Share of HH aged 35 to 54 2.108∗∗ -18.37∗∗∗ 1.797
(0.733) (3.506) (2.02)
Share of HH with access to 3mbs internet 1.370∗∗∗ -6.203∗∗∗ 0.336
(0.231) (1.102) (0.303)
Count of wired providers (ex. Comcast) 0.179∗∗ 2.663∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗
(0.593) (0.284) (3.39)
Observations 458 458 458
Note: The age bin for share of households aged 55 and over is excluded because the shares sum to 1.
The unit for population density is 100 individuals per sq. mile. The estimation includes fixed effects for
year and DMA. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The first regression uses the welfare measure when Netflix is removed. Markets with
younger households are hurt more when Netflix is removed, relative to the oldest age bin.
This aligns with the intuition that younger households tend to prefer the streaming services
format. The second regression uses the welfare measure when Comcast is removed.34 Mar-
kets that are younger tend to have a larger welfare loss after the removal of Comcast. Ad-
ditionally, markets with more wired competitors tend to experience less of a welfare effect
from the removal of Comcast. Which aligns with the story that these households could
replace their wired services with another provider. Finally, the third regression uses the
welfare measure when DirecTV is removed. Markets with more households in the oldest
age bin tend to have the largest welfare loss when DirecTV is removed.35 Taken together,
these results highlight the importance of the new product, streaming video services.
34Note, the Comcast simulation does not provide a clean comparison to Netflix because wired video
providers also offer internet services. The demand estimation includes the format-specific fixed effect, which
should absorb the internet services. However, the simulation which removes Comcast from the choice set
will not be able to separate out the welfare effect from the removal of Comcast video and internet services.
35This aligns with the story that older households value traditional delivery methods more, which is con-
sistent with their viewership behavior. Nielsen has data on live television viewership across age groups, and
the oldest groups have not changed their viewership behavior, while younger groups have decreased. With
the largest drops in viewerships being attributed to the youngest groups.
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1.7 Conclusion
The television industry saw the entry of new types of subscription television services, start-
ing with satellite providers in the late 1990s, then followed by telephone providers (telco)
in the mid–2000s. However, these were similar to the pre-existing products offered by ca-
ble providers—packages of channels offered as tiers of service.36 In contrast, the entry of
streaming services brought a product into the market with a lower price and more flexible
viewing options. Streaming services flourished, and consumers started opting-out of their
traditional services. This “cord-cutting” behavior led to the first ever decline in the total
traditional subscriber count in 2013, and it has continued to decline ever since. Traditional
providers recognize the competitive pressures they face from this new delivery method.
However, the literature and policy analysis continue to isolate traditional services when
analyzing the industry, and therefore they ignore important innovations that have occurred
within the industry.
This is the first paper to study the effect that streaming services have had on the demand
for television services. The empirical model exploits new market-level data on prices,
product characteristics, market shares, and market characteristics. Based on the demand
estimation, I find that even after allowing consumers to choose a combination of services,
the cross-price elasticities between traditional and streaming services are positive, which
suggests that consumers view these services as substitutes. I also find that the median own-
price elasticity across all television services is -7.15, with households being more elastic
for higher quality traditional packages.37 Moreover, I quantify the benefit of streaming
services using several simulations. I find that the median household must be compensated
$69 per year if streaming services are removed from their choice set in 2014 and 2015. The
simulation results show that Netflix had over three times as much of an effect on consumer
welfare when compared to DirecTV. My results suggest that streaming video services are
highly valued by consumers, highlighting the importance of including them in the model
for the demand of subscription television services.
The framework established in this chapter is a building block towards understanding
the broader impact that streaming services have had on the television industry. Future work
36There was some differentiation across delivery formats with the bundling of television and internet via
cable and telco providers, or the availability of out-of-network RSNs via satellite. However, even with the
differentiation across delivery format, the television content being sold was largely the same, especially after
the 1999 Satellite Home Viewers’ Improvement Act passed, which allowed satellite providers to air local
channels.
37As discussed in section 5.2, this value lies within the range of elasticities estimated within the previous
literature. However, it is closer to previous estimates of expanded basic or premium services, which suggests
that consumers are overall becoming more price-sensitive. The finding that households are more elastic for
higher-tiered products matches previous results as well.
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can use this method to incorporate a model for the supply of television services which
endogenizes prices and characteristics of cable packages. Further analysis could include an
investigation of the effects from: the unbundling of the traditional packages38, the indirect
network effects through advertising, the increased consolidation within the industry39, the
revenue model of streaming services (subscription vs. subscription + advertising), or the
release schedule of streaming television shows (linear vs. non-linear). Furthermore, there
could be extensions to the model for demand to allow for preference externalities of content.
Finally, the new economic environment created by the entry of streaming video services has
implications for competition within the television industry. Therefore, streaming services
should be included when analyzing antitrust cases, new policies, or legacy regulations.40
38Due to the entry of streaming platforms offered by cable channels (e.g., HBO Now, Starz, CBS All
Access)
39This includes both vertical and horizontal mergers across content producers and distributors (e.g., verti-
cal: AT&T and Time Warner; horizontal: Sinclair Broadcasting, AT&T and Dish Network).
40Such as program access and broadcast retrans. fees, regulations which only effect traditional providers.
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CHAPTER 2
The Effects of Streaming Video Services Entry on Cable Television
Prices
2.1 Introduction
The entry of a new product can have implications for competition within the industry. As I
described in the introduction to my dissertation, the impact that this new product has will
depend on the degree of innovation that it introduces. Streaming video services created
an entirely new type of television service, which resulted in a disruptive impact on the
industry. The direct effect on consumer welfare was explored in chapter one. I explore the
impact from the two indirect effects in this chapter.
There are two channels for streaming video services to indirectly effect1 consumer wel-
fare through their impact on prices: increased competition and a change to the bargaining
environment. The traditional distributors within the television industry recognize the com-
petitive pressure they face from the entry of streaming services with the loss of subscribers
to cord cutting and cord shaving. At the same time, traditional distributors are also fac-
ing increased content costs. These two changes will indirectly effect consumer welfare
through their impact on prices. For example, when a new product enters the market incum-
bents could respond by lowering their prices which could lead to an increase in consumer
welfare. On the other hand, if the entrant competes for inputs in the same upstream market
then it could drive up the input costs leading to higher downstream prices and a decrease in
consumer welfare. In this chapter, I quantify the consumer welfare effect from these two
channels.
In order to answer this question, I expand the methodology from chapter one to include
a model for the supply side which has firms competing in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with
differentiated products. I use GMM to estimate the cost parameters for cable providers.
After these parameters are estimated, I run a counterfactual simulation which removes the
1Further details of the three channels that the entry of a new product can have on consumer welfare are
included in the introduction to my dissertation.
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streaming service from the consumer’s choice sets and then re-evaluates the equilibrium
prices for cable providers. Finally, I use compensating variation to quantify the change in
consumer welfare.
I find that the entry of streaming services may have led to a $15 increase in cable prices
per month, and the median consumer welfare effect is $6.26 per month, which means that
as of 2014 and 2015 the median household would be willing to pay $6.26 per month to
avoid the higher cable prices from the entry of Netflix. The counterfactual simulation in
this chapter accounts for both indirect channels when calculating the consumer welfare
effect. However, further counterfactual simulations can be done to decompose the indirect
effects into the two channels from increased competition and changes to the bargaining
environment.
This chapter builds off of the methodology established in chapter one. This extension
fits within the strand of literature which examines entry within the television industry such
as Chu (2010) and Goolsbee and Petrin (2004). However, these papers focus on the en-
try of satellite providers. I contribute to the literature by examining and quantifying the
impact that streaming services have had on cable prices. Streaming services are lower
cost, offer differentiated content, and more flexibility for viewing. The streaming platform
also changed the structure of the television industry–many channels started offering direct-
to-consumer television services (e.g., HBO Now, CBS All Access, Showtime Anytime).
Therefore, streaming video services are an important new product to study because they
were a very disruptive entrant.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the second section focuses on
important details of the television industry, the third section describes the dataset, the fourth
section formalizes the supply of cable packages, the fifth section lays out the estimation and
the results, the sixth section presents the counterfactual simulation, and the seventh section
concludes.
2.2 Television Industry
As outlined in chapter one, the television industry has changed dramatically over the past
decade. In particular, there is a new distribution method for television services, subscription-
based streaming video services. In this section, I highlight key deails for the changes within
the industry, including the market structure and cable price trends.
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2.2.1 Market Structure
The market structure of the television industry is shown in figure 2.2. There are four
relevant players in this market, upstream channels, downstream distributors, streaming
providers, and consumers.
The vertical structure of the industry includes upstream channels (e.g., Bravo, HGTV,
ESPN) that license their television shows to the downstream distributors (e.g., Comcast,
AT&T, Dish). The downstream distributors bundle these channels into a package and sell
them as packages to the consumers for a monthly subscription price. The new addition to
the structure of the television industry is the streaming service, as shown in figure 2.2 with
yellow arrows. In this chapter, the television industry will be modeled in two stages: (1) the
downstream cable distributors set prices (2) the consumers choose television services. The
consumer’s choice for the television services is described in chapter one, and the model for
cable prices will be described in section 2.5.
Figure 2.1: Television Industry with Subscription-based Streaming Video Services
Consumers
Distributors
ChannelChannel Channel Streaming
PriceBundle
Content τfc
Content
τfc
Content
τfc
Content
Price
2.2.2 Cable Price Trends
Traditional distributors bundle networks into different tiers of services. These bundles typ-
ically fall into two types of tiers: basic and expanded basic. The basic cable package tend
to include all free-to-air TV channels and a select few cable channels, and the expanded
basic cable packages increase in cable channels included in the package. The average ca-
ble prices for basic and expanded basic packages have been rising over the last decade, as
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seen in figures 2.1 and 2.2. The data for these figures comes from the 2018 FCC Report
on Cable Industry Prices. The FCC is statutorily required to track cable prices annually
through a national survey of randomly sample of cable distributors in various communities
nationwide.
Figure 2.2: Average Expanded Basic Cable Prices in the United States
Source: FCC Report on Cable Industry Prices (2018)
Notes: The blue dashed line shows the projected average cable price using data from 2005 to 2011.
Figure 2.1 shows the average expanded basic cable prices in black, and the blue dashed line
shows the projection from a linear trend using the data from 2005 to 2011. Around 2011,
there was a jump in the average cable price.
Figure 2.3: Average Basic Cable Prices in the United States
Source: FCC Report on Cable Industry Prices (2018)
Notes: The blue dashed line shows the projected average cable price using data from 2005 to 2011.
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There was also an increase in basic cable prices starting in 2011, as shown in figure 2.2.
The timing of this change is interesting, because it is around the same time that Netflix and
Hulu launched their stand-alone streaming services. The increased competitive pressure
from the entry of a substitute should have downward pressure on prices.2. One potential
explanation could be that the rise in popularity of the streaming services increased the
pressure for inputs, driving up input costs such as the licensing fees.
Figure 2.4: Average License Fees for the Top Networks ($ per subscriber per month)
(a) ESPN and HBO Fees
(b) Other Top Networks
2An alternative explanation could be explored which considers a price discrimination story. The new lower
cost product causes the incumbent to target a specific segment within the market, the more price insensitive
customers. This effect has been found in prescription drugs for generic entry and newspapers with online and
print.
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The top networks’ estimated licensing fees are shown in figure 2.4. The data from the
years 2014 and 2015 will be used for the estimation of the cost parameters. Over the last
ten years licensing fees have been increasing at a rate which has outpaced inflation. These
licensing fees are an important input cost for cable distributors, they are the cost of getting
content from the upstream networks. It is interesting to note the change in slopes for the
sports networks, in particular, around 2012. One potential explanation is that live sporting
events were becoming relatively more important within a cable package and the sports
networks were therefore able to charge more for their content due to increased bargaining
power.
2.3 Data
The dataset I constructed includes information on cable providers in the United States from
2014 to 20153. I focus on cable providers in this chapter because they make their pricing
decision at a local level. I exclude distributors that price nationally, such as satellite and
streaming services. The rationale for this decision is that the product characteristics are
for a subset of these national provider’s markets4. In order to understand the satellite and
streaming provider’s pricing decision it would be necessary to expand the scope of this
dataset and to capture more of the national market.
The data required to estimate the model of supply includes product characteristics and
information on the cost of providing the service, as well as the demand parameters esti-
mated in chapter one. In the remainder of the section, I describe the sources that I used to
obtain each variable, and then I provide summary statistics for the dataset. The sources are
shown for each of the relevant variables in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Data Sources (2014 - 2015)
Variables Source(s) Geography
Cable
Package price
SNL Kagan, Select DMAs,
Distributors
Web Archive, Warren County, National
Package subscribers SNL Kagan County
Channel lineup SNL Kagan DMA
Avg. Licensing fees by Network SNL Kagan National
Distributor size SNL Kagan National
Vertical integration SNL Kagan National
3There is one exception to this timeframe, I use licensing fee data that goes back to 2011.
4The product characteristics are described in greater detail in chapter 1.
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The package price, package subscribers, and channel lineup are the same sources that
were used in chapter one. The package prices are difficult to find at a local level, so this
information was pulled from a variety of sources including SNL Kagan, the web archive,
local cable commission websites, and Warren Communications TV Factbook. The package
subscribers and channel lineup data comes from the MediaCensus database within SNL
Kagan.
The additional data needed for the supply-side estimation comes from SNL Kagan.
This source includes information on average licensing fees by network, total subscribers by
distributor, and vertical integration. The average licensing fees by network are estimated by
SNL Kagan with units of $/subscriber/month. These fees are a key input cost, and the price
that downstream distributors pay to upstream channels to package their television content
into a service to be sold to consumers. The distributor size is the national subscriber count
for a distributor. This is an important determinant for input costs that traditional distributors
are charged. Finally, the vertical integration is the ownership share that a distributor has for
the channels in their package lineup.5 The summary statistics for the new data are shown
below in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics (2014 - 2015)
N Mean SD Min Max
Monthly Advertised Price ($) 1,700 60.24 32.58 9.80 157.99
Vertical integration 1,700 2.9 3.9 0 10
Total channels 1,700 111.83 72.89 8 245
Licensing fee ($/subscriber/month) 392 0.30 0.72 0.01 7.23
Distributor Size (/10 million) 10 0.864 0.786 0.257 2.151
The number of observations for the monthly advertised price, vertical integration, and
total channels is 1700. This count includes data that varies at the provider/package/year/county
level. The licensing fee data has 392 observations, which has information at the chan-
nel/year level. Finally, the distributor size data has 10 observations which varies at the
provider/year level.
2.4 Supply
The model for the competition in the television industry will be Bertrand-Nash with dif-
ferentiated products. The profit-maximization problem will be defined for the downstream
5If the distributor owns the channel in their lineup then the vertical integration for that channel is 1. This
is repeated for all channels in the lineup and the total ownership share is used.
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competition.
The cable distributors will be setting prices at the county-level to maximize profits.
Cable distributors are multiproduct firms, and will set the prices for all products they offer
within that market. The profit function is shown in the equation below:
Πfm(pm) = M
∑
j∈Jfm
pjm − ∑
c∈Cjm
τfc
 sjm(pm)
Where M is the market size, Jfm are the set of packages that the cable firm offers in the
market m, pjm is the price for the package,
∑
τfc is the sum of the licensing fees across
channels included in the package, and sjm is the market share for the package.
The first-order condition to maximize firm f ’s profits with respect to the price of pack-
age k in market m is
∂Πfm(pm)
∂pkm
=
∑
j∈Jfm
pjm − ∑
c∈Cjm
τfc
 ∂sjm(pm)
∂pkm
+ skm(pm)
This first order condition will be used in the GMM estimation.
2.5 Estimation
The parameters are estimated using a GMM routine. Following Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2012), the GMM estimation will consist of two types of moments, one that matches the
national average for the licensing fees6 and one that matches the pricing first order condi-
tion.
2.5.1 National Average Licensing Fees
The licensing fee, τfc, that distributor f pays for channel c is parameterized using the spec-
ification in Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012). These input costs are a function of channel
characteristics and are scaled by a function of firm and channel.
τˆfc(η, φ) = (η1 + η2τc)exp(φ1SIZEf + φ2V Ifc)
6The licensing fees for each network, the most important variable cost for distributors, are observed as a
national average.
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Where τc is the (observed) Kagan average input cost for channel c, SIZEf is the firms
total number of subscribers, and V Ifc is the ownership share firm f has in the channel
c. This functional form allows for different channels to have different base rates for each
distributor, but the distributor size and vertical integration effect will be the same for all
channels. For example, based on it’s size, Charter Communications could have a 10 percent
discount on the rate for the Disney channel, a channel that it does not own7. With this
input cost specification, it will also have a 10 percent discount on any other channel that
it does not own. This is a restrictive assumption; however, this specification captures the
distributor size effect, which is known to be the most important determinant for differences
in the licensing fees for a given channel across firms.
The weighted average of τfc over firms predicts the national-average input cost for each
channel c. These will be matched to the observed data in the Kagan Economics of Basic
Cable Network dataset’s channel input costs, τc.
Ef [τˆfc(η, φ)]− τc = 0
This is the first set of moment conditions—the national average licensing fee predicted by
the model should equal the observed licensing fee.
2.5.2 Profit Maximization
The second set of moment conditions will result from the profit maximization for cable
distributors. The cable distributors will be setting prices at the county-level to maximize
profits. Cable distributors are multiproduct firms, and will set the prices for all products
they offer within that market. The profit function for firm f in market m is shown in the
equation below.
Πfm(pm) = M
∑
j∈Jfm
pjm − ∑
c∈Cjm
τfc
 sjm(pm)
where M is the market size, Jfm are the set of packages that the cable firm offers in the
market, pjm is the price for the package,
∑
τfc is the sum of the licensing fees across
channels included in the package, and sjm is the market share for the package.
The first-order condition to maximize firm f ’s profits with respect to the price of pack-
age k in market m is shown in the equation below.
7Representing the vertical integration between that distributor and that channel, V Ifc.
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∂Πfndm(pm)
∂pkm
=
∑
j∈Jfm
pjm − ∑
c∈Cjm
τfc
 ∂sjm(p)
∂pkm
+ skm(pm)
The first-order conditions can be used to form the following set of moment conditions for
the Nash pricing: [
1
J
∑
j SZjm(mˆcjm −
∑
c∈Cjm τˆ(η, φ))
1
J
∑
j V Ijm(mˆcjm −
∑
c∈Cjm τˆ(η, φ))
]
= 0
2.5.3 Results
I find that the estimated median marginal costs for packages ranges from $7.94 for basic,
$29.87 for expanded basic, and $67.52 for premium.
The demand estimates from chapter one are combined with the two sets of moment
conditions: (1) the average licensing fee per channel from SNL Kagan, and (2) the Nash
pricing assumption to estimate the input cost parameters η and φ. The results from the
estimation are shown in table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Input Cost Parameters
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Constant η1 0.044 0.379
SNL Kagan scale η2 0.959 3.916
Distributor size φ1 -0.284 3.721
Vertical integration φ2 -0.207 0.891
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The input cost parameters are η and φ. The η1 and η2 account for the different base
rates for different channels, and the φ1 and φ2 will differentiate the effect for distributor
size and vertical integration for a distributor for all channels.8 The first set of moment
conditions help the model match the aggregate level of input costs and the second set of
moment conditions help to pin down the variation of input costs across firms. I find that the
8This follows the parametrization from Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), which they admit is restrictive
because a distributor will have the same discount for all channels that it is not vertically integrated. How-
ever, it will capture the impact from the distributor size which is known to be the most important factor for
differences in fees for a particular channel across distributors.
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estimated effect of the distributor size and vertical integration is negative. The identification
of these parameters can be motivated by the two regressions shown in Table 2.4. The
regression results show that the size of a distributor is negatively related to the price after
conditioning on the product characteristics. These results indicate that a larger distributor
will have a lower per-channel input costs. Larger distributors also have lower estimated
marginal costs. A more vertically integrated9 distributor has lower prices when more of the
channels they own are included in the package, although estimated marginal costs are not.
Table 2.4: Regression Analysis of Distributor Size on Price and Estimated Marginal Cost
(1) (2)
Price Std. Error Estimated marginal cost Std. Error
Distributor size (/10M subcribers) -5.703∗∗∗ 0.536 -19.806∗∗∗ 5.365
Vertical integration -6.384∗∗∗ 7.772 28.239 77.737
Channel Fixed Effects Y Y
Tier Fixed Effects Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y
Observations 1700 1700
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
2.6 Counterfactual
The counterfactual simulation removes the streaming service from the consumer’s choice
sets, and re-evaluates the equilibrium prices for firms that set local prices. This simulation
will capture the indirect effect that streaming services had on cable prices.
An important data limitation that impacts this simulation is that the time period for the
estimation is restricted to the “post” introduction period, which means that the marginal
costs for the distributors will already incorporate the effect of streaming services. To ad-
dress this limitation, I use historical SNL Kagan licensing fee data from 2006 to 2011, a
period of time prior to the rise of streaming services, and project fees for 2014 and 2015.
This methodology allows me to proxy for a counterfactual situation without streaming ser-
vices. Note, that this is an assumption on the licensing fees that would have prevailed in
the absence of streaming services. Figure 2.5 shows the counterfactual fees for ESPN and
HBO.
9The amount of channels in their package that they own. This value ranges from zero to one and represents
the fractional ownership of the company.
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Figure 2.5: Counterfactual Average License Fees ($ per subscriber per month)
(a) Average ESPN Licensing Fee
(b) Average HBO Licensing Fee
Source: SNL Kagan.
Notes: The blue dashed line shows the projected fee using the data from 2006 to 2012.
The solid line in figure 2.5 (a) and (b) show the licensing fee (dollar per subscriber per
month) that the average television distributor had to pay to the networks to air their content.
The solid line shows the observed fees and the blue dashed line shows the projected fees
based on the data from 2006 to 2011. The two blue dots show the counterfactual fees for
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the average distributor that are used for each network for 2014 and 2015. This projection
is done for all available networks. It is interesting to note that HBO had a decrease in
the licensing fee relative to the projected amount, whereas ESPN’s licensing fee increased
relative to the projected amount. One potential explanation for this outcome is that HBO
could be viewed as a substitute to the streaming services and ESPN (live sports) could be
viewed as a complement. Moreover, ESPN remained exclusively on cable packages, while
HBO started offering HBONow as a stand-alone service in 2015.
The counterfactual licensing fees are then used in the marginal cost specification
τˆ cffc (η, φ) = (η1 + η2τ
cf
c )exp(φ1SIZEf + φ2V Ifc)
where τ cfc is the counterfactual Kagan average input cost for channel c, SIZEf is the firms
total number of subscribers, and V Ifc is the ownership share firm f has in the channel c.
This new marginal cost is used to find the counterfactual price vector. Finally, I use the new
price vector to calculate the consumer welfare effects using compensating variation. Note,
given the time horizon in the data set this can be interpreted as a short run effect.
After adjusting the licensing fees for the counterfactual simulation, I find that on av-
erage prices for cable packages would have been around $15 less10. Table 2.5 shows the
median change in average-per household welfare11 for the simulation. I find that the me-
dian consumer welfare effect is $6.26 per month, which means that the median household
would be willing to pay $6.26 per month to avoid the higher cable prices from the entry of
Netflix.
Table 2.5: Counterfactual Simulation (Monthly)
Median ∆Welfarect
1
∆Welfare (millions)
$6.26 $2122.87
1The monthly average per-household CV
2.7 Conclusion
The entry of a new product can have implications for competition within the industry. The
success of the streaming platform changed the structure of the television industry–many
channels started offering direct-to-consumer television services (e.g., HBO Now, CBS All
10The average price of a cable package in the observed data is $59.59 and the average price of the counter-
factual cable package is $44.23.
11Calculated using the average-per household compensating variation expression.
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Access, Showtime Anytime). I contribute to the literature by examining and quantifying the
indirect impact that streaming services have had on cable prices and the consumer welfare.
In order to answer this question, I expand the methodology used in chapter one to
include a supply side which has firms competing in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with dif-
ferentiated products. I use GMM to estimate the cost parameters for cable providers. After
these parameters are estimated, I run a counterfactual simulation which removes the stream-
ing service from the consumer’s choice sets and then re-evaluates the equilibrium prices for
cable providers. This means that there are two channels for streaming services to affect the
industry, first through the direct decision of what products consumers subscribe to, and
second through the indirect effect of prices. I find that the entry of streaming services may
have led to a $15 increase in cable prices per month, and the median consumer welfare
effect is $6.26 per month, which means that the median household would be willing to pay
$6.26 per month to avoid the higher cable prices from the entry of Netflix.
Further work can be done to understand the impact that streaming services had on the
television industry. Currently, I am only accounting for the change in price, however, there
are other characteristics of television services that have changed after the introduction of
streaming services. Therefore, future work could endogenize other product characteristics
and quantify their impact on consumers. There could also be work done that incorporates
the vertical structure of the industry to understand how the bargaining environment has
evolved during the streaming era. There could also be work done on antitrust or policy
issues such as the horizontal and vertical mergers that are occurring within the television
industry.
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CHAPTER 3
Horizontal Merger Analysis in the Streaming Era
3.1 Introduction
A key concern within the field of Industrial Organization is the impact that a merger will
have on consumer welfare. On one hand, a merger could lead to synergies in production
or increased scale which could lower costs and lead to lower prices for consumers. While
on the other hand, a merger could lead to anticompetitive behavior–a more concentrated
market with firms able to exert more market power leading to higher prices for consumers.
Over the last ten years, the television industry has been undergoing technologial innova-
tions in delivery of content, and there has been an increase in concentration. In this chapter,
I consider a horizontal merger within the television industry allowing for the inclusion of
streaming services within the product market defintion.
To quantify this effect, I rely on the models, data, and estimation established in chapters
one and two. The dataset includes information for the top traditional distributors in ten
DMAs within the United States for 2014 and 2015. The demand parameters were estimated
in chapter one using a nested fixed point algorithm, and the supply parameters are estimated
in chapter two using GMM. Using these parameters, I run a horizontal merger simulation
for the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable to determine the welfare
effect on consumers. The change in consumer welfare is defined as the compensating
variation. I find that the median consumer welfare effect is $4.01 per month, which means
that as of 2014 and 2015 the median household would be willing to pay $4.01 per month
to avoid the higher cable prices from the merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable.
This chapter contributes to two strands of the literature—merger analyses and stud-
ies of the television industry. Some relevant papers within the literature include Nevo
(2000), Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Chu (2010), Goolsbee and Petrin (2004), Gools-
bee (2007), and Fan (2013). I contribute to the literature by using a new dataset which
includes data from the streaming era.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the second section provides his-
torical context for mergers in the television industry, the third section describes the dataset,
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the fourth section formalizes the model, the fifth section details the estimation procedure
and results, the sixth section presents the counterfactual simulation, and the seventh section
concludes.
3.2 Mergers in the Television Industry
There are two classifications for mergers that can occur within an industry: horizontal and
vertical. Horizontal mergers are between two firms that operate in the same space in the
supply chain, and often are competitors offering the same product. Vertical mergers occur
when two firms merge that operate in different parts of the supply chain. In this chapter, I
focus on horizontal mergers between traditional distributors.
Over the last decade, traditional distributors have been consolidating ownership and in-
creasing the concentration within the industry. According to a 2015 study from Leichtman
Research Group, the top 13 traditional television distributors controlled 95% of the total
number of traditional subscribers. Leichtman (2015) The number of subscribers for the top
television providers for 2014 are shown in table 3.1. Next, I highlight some of the larger
horizontal mergers in figure 3.1 to provide historical context for this chapter.
Table 3.1: Top Traditional Television Subscribers in the U.S. (2015 end of Q3)
Subscribers Share
Cable
Comcast 22,258,000 23.7%
Time Warner Cable 10,977,000 11.7%
Charter 4,274,000 4.5%
Cablevision 2,604,000 2.8%
Suddenlink 1,094,100 1.2%
Mediacom 862,000 0.9%
Cable ONE 380,807 0.4%
Other Major Cable 6,360,000 6.8%
Total Top Cable 48,809,907 51.9%
Satellite (DBS)
DIRECTV 19,570,000 20.8%
DISH 13,909,000 14.8%
Total DBS 33,479,000 35.6%
Telco
AT&T U-verse 5,880,000 6.3%
Verizon FiOS 5,807,000 6.2%
Total Top Telco 11,687,000 12.4%
Total Top Providers 93,975,907 100%
Source: Leichtman Research Group (2015).
39
Figure 3.1: Top Mergers in the Television Industry
In 2005, Comcast and Time Warner Cable agreed to seperately acquire Adelphia Com-
munications1. Time Warner Cable and Comcast also had to exchange cable systems in
certain markets2. The next wave of consolidation occurred between 2014 and 2015. In
May 2014, AT&T announced that it would purchase DirecTV a deal that combined the
second largest traditional distributor with the sixth largest distributor. AT&T and DirecTV
are also the top telco and satellite distributors. Then, in October 2014, Comcast announced
their intention to merge with Time Warner Cable. This proposed merger which would have
combined two of the largest traditional distributors3. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the FCC were concerned with the consolidation of market power. Comcast would have
become “an unavoidable gatekeeper for Internet based-services that rely on a broadband
connection to reach consumers” DOJ (2015). Comcast abandoned the merger in 2015 after
14 months of trying to get through the approval process. This failed merger is the focus of
the counterfactual simulation. Finally, in 2015 there was a series of acquisitions announced
by Charter and Altice. Charter Communications announced mergers with Bright House
Networks and Time Waner Cable. Then Altice announced mergers with Suddenlink and
1Adelphia was the fifth largest cable distributor and the seventh largest traditional distributor.
2“In the exchange transactions, Time Warner Cable will receive current Comcast systems located in
or around Los Angeles, California; Cleveland, Ohio; and Dallas, Texas, and systems currently owned by
Century-TCI California Communications, L.P., in the Los Angeles area, and by Parnassos Communications,
L.P. and Western Cablevision, L.P., in Ohio and western New York. Comcast will receive Time Warner’s
current cable systems serving portions of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and certain systems currently owned by
Adelphia located in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mary-
land, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, Vermont, Washington
and West Virginia.” Cannon (2005)
3Comcast was the largest distributor and Time Warner Cable was the fourth largest distributor.
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Cablevision.
Future work on mergers within the television industry can focus on the impact of verti-
cal mergers. With the rise in streaming services and the prevalence of exclusive content on
streaming platforms, there has been an increase in the vertical integration between content
producers and content distributors.
3.3 Data
To run a merger simulation you need data for the product characteristics, market shares,
market characteristics, and input costs. The data spans 2014-2015 for the top traditional
distributors in ten DMAs in the United States, and is the combination of the datasets con-
structed in chapter one and two. The sources for each variable are shown in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Data Sources (2014 - 2015)
Variables Source(s) Geography
Traditional
Package price
SNL Kagan, Select DMAs,
Distributors
Web Archive, Warren County, National
Package subscribers SNL Kagan County
Channel lineup SNL Kagan DMA
24 hr listings by channel Channel Guide National
Avg. Licensing fees by Network SNL Kagan National
Total subscribers SNL Kagan National
Vertical integration SNL Kagan National
Netflix
Subscribers Nielsen Select DMAs
Price Web Archive National
Aggregate title count SNL Kagan National
Joint: Traditional Market penetration SNL Kagan, 2016 Survey National
& Streaming
Demographics
Median HH income Census, ACS County
Population density Census, ACS County
Share of HH by age Census, ACS County
Share of HH with access
Census, ACS Countyto 3mbs internet
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3.4 Model
3.4.1 Demand
As in chapter one, the conditional indirect utility function of subscribing to the television
service j, for household i, in market m, in year t, will take the following form:
Uijmt = αpjmt + βXjdt + φYmt + ηi,format(j) + γd + ζt + ξjmt + ijmt
where Xjdt includes non-price product characteristics, such as the unique count of televi-
sion shows, and pjmt is the advertised monthly subscription price for the television service.4
Ymt includes county characteristics such as the fraction of householders by age within a
county. Finally, the ξjmt term is the unobserved product characteristics.
The ηi,format(j) allows for persistent horizontal differentiation across format types (wired,
satellite). These heterogeneous tastes could account for format-specific characteristics,
such as the transmission technology itself or alternative features that are included with
each format type. This term will also capture unobserved, within-market heterogeneity in
access to each format type. Finally, the consumers also have an idiosyncratic preference
shock for the product j, ijmt. These are assumed to be i.i.d. draws from a mean zero Type
I Extreme Value distribution with the scale parameter, σ, normalized to 1.
3.4.2 Supply
As in chapter two, the model for the competition in the television industry will be Bertrand-
Nash with differentiated products. This estimation technique relies on the profit-maximization
condition to back out the marginal costs. The profit-maximization problem will be defined
for the downstream competition among distributors following Crawford and Yurukoglu
(2012). The profit function for the multiproduct firm f in market m takes the following
form
Πfm(pm) = M
∑
j∈Jfm
pjm − ∑
c∈Cjm
τfc
 sjm(pm)
where M is the market size, Jfm are the set of products that the firm offers in the market,
pjm is the price of the product, τfc is the licensing fee for each channel within the package,
and sjm is the market share for the product. The first-order condition to maximize firm f ’s
profits with respect to the price of package k in market m is shown in the equation below.
4Some of the products have prices that are national (e.g. satellite, streaming)
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∂Πfm(pm)
∂pkm
=
∑
j∈Jfm
pjm − ∑
c∈Cjm
τfc
 ∂sjm(p)
∂pkm
+ skm(pm)
The first order condition for the multiproduct firm in a market can be rearranged and written
in matrix form
τf = pm −∆(pm,X)−1s(p)
where ∆(pm,X) is the matrix of own and cross-price share derivatives that accounts for
ownership5 of the products within the market, τf is the sum of the licensing fees for the
channels included in the product, pm is the price of the product, and s(pm) is the market
share for the product.
3.5 Estimation
The demand parameters are found in chapter one using a nested fixed point algorithm, and
the supply parameters are found in chapter two using a GMM estimation routine. The
parameter values are shown in tables 3.3 an 3.4 below.
Table 3.3: Demand Parameters
Estimates Std. Error
Mean utility
Price α -0.123∗ (0.053)
log(TV show count) β1 6.240∗∗ (2.30)
TV show overlap with Netflix (%) β2 -0.648∗∗ (0.215)
Median HH income ($10k) φ1 -0.142∗∗ (0.052)
Population density (/1000) φ2 -0.019∗∗∗ (0.005)
Share of HH aged 15 to 34 φ3 -4.162∗∗∗ (1.154)
Share of HH aged 35 to 54 φ4 -1.264 (1.389)
Share of HH with 3mbs internet φ5 -0.232 (0.776)
Horizontal heterogeneity
Wired format σwired 3.187 (2.586)
Satellite format σsatellite 2.796 (4.455)
Diminishing utility κ 0.295 (2.366)
Note: The age bin for share of households aged 55 and over is excluded because the shares
sum to 1. The unit for population is 1000 individuals. The estimation includes fixed effects
for format, year, and DMA. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
5If the two products have the same owner, then the entry within the matrix will be the deriviate of the
market share with respect to price. If the two products have different owners then the entry will be 0.
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Table 3.4: Input Cost Parameters
Parameter Estimate Standard Error
Constant η1 0.044 (0.379)
SNL Kagan scale η2 0.959 (3.916)
Distributor size φ1 -0.284 (3.721)
Vertical integration φ2 -0.207 (0.891)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
3.6 Counterfactual
The counterfactual conducted in this chapter will calculate the consumer welfare impact
from the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable. This merger would
have consolidated power among the first and second largest cable distributors, which caused
concern among the antitrust authorities.
To conduct the counterfactual simulation, I will change the ownership matrix within
the first order condition, and adjust the marginal costs for the larger distributor size. Then,
using these the counterfactual prices I calculate the change in consumer welfare. The con-
sumer welfare effect will be defined as the compensating variation. The consumer welfare
effect is shown in table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Counterfactual Simulation (Monthly)
Median ∆Welfarect
1
∆Welfare (millions)
$4.01 $2945.78
1The monthly average per-household CV
I find that the median consumer welfare effect is $4.01 per month, which means that as of
2014 and 2015 the median household would be willing to pay $4.01 per month to avoid
the higher cable prices from the merger of Comcast and Time Warner Cable. The total
consumer welfare effect is $2945.78 per month.
3.7 Conclusion
The television industry has been experiencing consolidation among distributors for the last
decade. An important question within the field of Industrial Organization is whether a
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merger should be allowed or not. The impact of a merger can either be positive or nega-
tive on consumer welfare. In this chapter, I calculate the consumer welfare effect of the
proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner Cable.
Building off the models, data, and estimation established in chapters one and two I
quantify the effect of the merger. The dataset includes information for the top traditional
distributors in ten DMAs within the United States for 2014 and 2015. The demand param-
eters were estimated in chapter one using a nested fixed point algorithm, and the supply
parameters are estimated in chapter two using GMM. Using these parameters, I run a
horizontal merger simulation for the proposed merger between Comcast and Time Warner
Cable to determine the welfare effect on consumers. The welfare effect is defined as the
compensating variation. I find that the median consumer welfare effect is $4.01 per month,
which means that as of 2014 and 2015 the median household would be willing to pay $4.01
per month to avoid the higher cable prices from the merger of Comcast and Time Warner
Cable. The total consumer welfare effect is $2945.78 per month.
There is still a lot of work that can be done in this area. Future work could include
an examination of the impact of mergers in the television industry. This could include
endogenizing the product characteristics to allow for other characteristics to respond to
a merger. There could also be studies of the vertical mergers that are occuring within
the industry, such as the AT&T and Time Warner merger. These are important issues for
antitrust regulators and policy analysts.
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APPENDIX A
Dataset Details
A.1 Data Sources
SNL Kagan Media and Communications
The SNL Kagan Media and Communications database includes operating data for
companies within the television industry (e.g. cable/satellite providers, streaming
distributors, and television networks), content characteristics, and subscriber counts.
The content characteristics include channel lineups for the specific packages from
SNL Kagan, tv show counts for the streaming providers from SNL Kagan. SNL
Kagan also includes an annual survey called Consumer Insights which surveys con-
sumers on their preferences and subscription behavior.
Channel Guide
The Channel Guide is a monthly publication which lists the tv shows airing on over
100 traditional networks. This source includes among other details, the name of the
television show and the networks that the television show airs on. I was provided
with pdf copies of the archived versions from the publisher.
Nielsen Local Watch Reports
The Nielsen Local Watch Reports are publicly released and include trends across the
“Local people meters (LPM)” markets. LPM “are used in the Top 25 markets to
electronically capture both tuning and viewing at the household and persons level.”
Nielsen (2019) Starting in 2014, Nielsen began to track the subscription to streaming
video services using LPM. They publicly reported the top 10 DMAs for Netflix for
2014 and 2015. The remaining markets and/or subsequent years are available for
purchase.
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Warren Communication TV Factbook
The Warren Communications TV Factbook has information on cable packages and
prices offered by cable distributors at the “Principal Community” level. This source
was discontinued at the end of 2017.
A.2 Constructed Variable Definitions
Monthly Advertised Price ($):
The cost for subscribing to television services from traditional distributors and stream-
ing services. Historical package prices for traditional distributors can be difficult to
find at a local-level. I followed the method described in the Crawford et al. (2018),
which involved using the web archive to obtain historical rate cards for the televi-
sion services. Whenever possible, I used local rate cards or found rates listed in the
web archive to populate the data. I supplemented this with data from SNL Kagan
and the Warren Communications TV Factbook. SNL Kagan collects an annual snap-
shot of package prices for the top traditional distributors in select DMAs, however,
this source is incomplete. There are DMAs that a distributor serves that SNL Ka-
gan did not record. Therefore, I also sought additional sources, such as the Warren
Communications TV Factbook. Warren includes datasets for cable package prices at
a principal community level.1,2 However, I only used Warren as a source for basic
prices if this information was not available elsewhere. Prices for the satellite and
streaming providers were easier to track down because the price is national. This
information was found by visiting the distributor’s website stored in the web archive.
Unique TV Show Title Count:
For traditional services, this variable is constructed by combining the channel line-
ups for a package from SNL Kagan with the Channel Guide listings which has the
list of television shows aired in a month. For Netflix, this variable is constructed by
scraping the content library titles from the web archive.
1The principal community includes a list of counties that are served by this provider in the area.
2There are well-documented downsides with this source (e.g. sample attrition, they only track cable
distributors, which means telco packages aren’t included).
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Overlap of TV Show Titles with Netflix (%):
This variable is constructed by comparing the unique TV show titles for traditional
services with the unique TV show titles for Netflix.
Vertical Integration:
Measures the ownership share that cable distributors have for channels included in
their television packages. If the distributor owns 50% stake in the channel then the
vertical integration would be 0.5. This value is summed for each provider/package/
county/dma/year observation.
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APPENDIX B
Market Penetration
Following Fan (2013)1, the probability that household i chooses product j as their first or
second choice in market m at time t is:
P(Yimt = j|X, type(j), ..) = P(Uijmt > max
s
Uis,∀s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(j is first)
+
∑
j′
P(Uij′mt > Uijmt > max
h6=j′
Uihmt, Uijmt − κ > Ui0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(j is second)
This probability translates into the following market penetration equation for product j:
sjmt =
∫
Υ
(1)
j dF (νi, ηi) +
∑
j′
∫ (
Υ
(21)
j,j′ −Υ(22)j
)
dF (ηi)
where
Υ
(1)
j =
exp(δj + µij)
1 +
∑
s=1,..,J
exp(δs + µis)
Υ
(21)
j,j′ =
exp(δj + µij)
exp(κ) +
∑
h6=j′
exp(δh + µih)
Υ
(22)
j =
exp(δj + µij)
exp(κ) +
∑
s
exp(δs + µik)
The market penetration for streaming services is observed at the DMA-level. Therefore,
I use the following weighted sum to the aggregate the predicted market penetration from
county to DMA-level:
sjdt =
∑
c∈d
(sjct ∗ wc)
1Fan (2013) includes a proof which shows that the multiple-discrete choice model will have a unique
solution to the contraction mapping under two assumptions: (1) 0 < sjt < 1 ∀j = 1, .., Jct and (2)∑Jct
j=1 < 2.
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wherewc is defined as the household weight for county c and sjct is the predicted market
penetration of the product j in the county c.
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APPENDIX C
Instrumental Variables
The excluded instruments are defined as the following:
IV1 BLP-style Sum of other providers tv shows in the same county
IV2 BLP-style Sum of the same providers tv shows in other products in the same county
IV3 BLP-style Number of competitors in the county by format
IV4 Cost shifter National subscriber counts from t-1
IV5 Cost shifter Annual information payroll by county
IV6 Cost shifter Annual broadcast payroll (ex. internet) by county
Table C.1: First Stage Regression Results
Price Std. Error
log(TV show count) 42.355∗∗∗ (0.687)
Overlap TV show -3.719∗∗∗ (0.278)
Share of HH with 3mbs internet -0.014 (0.491)
Share of HH aged 15 to 34 1.776∗ (0.843)
Share of HH aged 35 to 54 3.100∗∗ (0.900)
Median HH Income -0.0516 (0.043)
Population Density -0.0523∗∗ (0.016)
Excluded:
IV1 0.0003 (0.00002)
IV2 0.192∗ (0.026)
IV3 -2.35∗ (1.138)
IV4 -0.267∗ (0.111)
IV5 0 .00006∗∗ (0.00002)
IV6 0.00002 (0.00005)
Observations 9018
DMA Fixed Effect Y
Year Fixed Effect Y
Format Fixed Effect Y
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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APPENDIX D
Price Elasticity of Demand
The price elasticity of demand is defined as ∂Sjmt
∂pl
pl
Sj
which describes how consumers’ pur-
chases will change following a price increase of any of the available goods. The price
elasticities will be a matrix where the own-price elasticity will be on the diagonal, and the
cross-price elasticity will be off-diagonal.
∂S
∂p
=
∂Sj∂pj ∂Sj∂p`
∂S`
∂pj
∂S`
∂p`

Recall the definition for the market penetration equation:
Sjmt =
∫
Υ
(1)
j dF (ηi) +
∑
j′
∫
Υ
(21)
j,j′ −Υ(22)j dF (ηi)
Υ
(1)
j =
exp(δj + µij)
1 +
∑
s=1,..,J
exp(δs + µis)
Υ
(21)
j,j′ =
exp(δj + µij)
exp(κ) +
∑
h6=j′
exp(δh + µih)
Υ
(22)
j =
exp(δj + µij)
exp(κ) +
∑
s
exp(δs + µik)
Then, the derivative for the own-price term is the following:
∂Sj
∂pj
=
∂
∂pj
∫
Υ
(1)
j dF (.) +
∂
∂pj
∑
j′ 6=j
∫
Υ
(21)
j,j′ −Υ
(22)
j dF (.)
=
∫
αΥ
(1)
j
(
1−Υ(1)j
)
dF (.) +
∑
j′ 6=j
∫
αΥ
(21)
j,j′
(
1−Υ(21)
j,j′
)
− αΥ(22)j
(
1−Υ(22)j
)
dF (.)
The derivative for the cross-price term is the following:
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∂Sj
∂p`
=
∂
∂p`
∫
Υ
(1)
j dF (.) +
∂
∂p`
∑
j′ 6=j
∫
Υ
(21)
j,j′ −Υ
(22)
j dF (.)
=
∫
(−α)Υ(1)j Υ(1)` dF (.) +
∑
j′ 6=j
∫
(−α)Υ(21)
j,j′ Υ
(21)
`,j′ − (−α)Υ
(22)
j Υ
(22)
` dF (.)
A sample market elasticity matrix is shown on the next page.
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APPENDIX E
Compensating Variation
This section will show the expression for the welfare measure used in the analysis. The
closed form compensating variation measure from Small and Rosen (1981) will be used to
quantify the consumer welfare effect from the introduction of streaming services.
CVict =
V 0i − V 1i
α
Where α is the structural parameter estimated from the model, and V 0i is the inclusive value
for consumer i before the introduction of streaming services and the V 1i is after the intro-
duction of streaming services.
The inclusive value for consumer i will include the values for the first and second
choices. The inclusive value is defined as follows:
V 0i = ln
( Jmt∑
j=1
exp(U˜0ijmt) + 1
)
+
∑
j′
(
ln
( ∑
h6=j′
exp(U˜0ihmt − κ) + 1
)
− ln
( Jmt∑
j=1
exp(U˜0ijmt − κ) + 1
))
where the U˜ removes the idiosyncratic shock from the consumer’s utility function. Note
that the U˜ still depends on unobserved heterogenous terms so I will need to take the expec-
tation of the CVi over the ηijmt term.
The average-per household change in welfare can be found by averaging across the
simulated households:
∆Welfarect = E[CVict]
The total welfare loss for these markets can be found by using the following calculation:
∆Welfare =
∑
ct
Hct ·∆Welfarect
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